

Verification of Real-valued Programs

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
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- 1 Motivation
- 2 Symbolic Methods
- 3 Sum of Squares and SDP
- 4 Positivstellensatz and Certification
- 5 Barrier Certificates and Safety
- 6 Toolchain and Practice
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Motivation



Verification Over Reals is Hard

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- Quantifier elimination and SMT solving struggle with **scaling**.

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- Real-valued programs have **continuous** state spaces.
 - Nonlinear arithmetic leads to undecidable theories.
 - First-order theory of reals is decidable but **doubly-exponential**.
 - Quantifier elimination and SMT solving struggle with **scaling**.
- Need to exploit some (algebraic) structure (or accept conservative approximations)

Symbolic Methods: Quantifier Elimination and Gröbner Bases

- **Quantifier Elimination:**
- Eliminate quantifiers from logical formulas over the reals.
- Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition (CAD) [Tarski/Collins].
- High complexity: 2^{2^n} in general.
- Effective on low-dimensional systems.
- **Gröbner Bases:** Solve polynomial equations by computing canonical basis.
- Useful for loop invariants and ideal membership.
- Still **doubly-exponential** in worst case.

Motivating SOS: From Nonnegativity to Certificates

- Instead of brute-force search over the reals, we can attempt to prove a required inequality by exhibiting a **certificate**.
- If we need to show a polynomial $f(x)$ is always nonnegative, it suffices to express f in a form that makes nonnegativity obvious.
- One powerful certificate is a sum of squares (SOS) representation: If $f(x)$ can be written as $f(x) = \sum_i h_i^2(x)$ for some polynomials h_i , then clearly $f(x) \geq 0$ **for all** x .
- SOS is a sufficient condition for polynomial nonnegativity (every SOS is globally ≥ 0 by construction)
- SOS decomposition constitutes a proof / certificate of f 's nonnegativity

Hilbert and the Limits of SOS

- **Hilbert's Seventeenth Problem:** Can any positive semi-definite polynomial be written as a sum of squares of rational functions: $p = \sum_{j=1}^k \frac{\sigma_j^2}{\xi_j^2}$?
- Hilbert showed in 1888 that not all positive polynomials are SOS.
- **Motzkin Polynomial:** $x^4y^2 + x^2y^4 + 1 - 3x^2y^2$ is ≥ 0 , not SOS.
- But every positive polynomial is a sum of squares of rational functions (Artin 1927).

SOS and Semidefinite Programming (SDP)

- Checking SOS reduces to SDP:

$$f(x) = Z(x)^T Q Z(x), \quad Q \succeq 0$$

- SDP is convex & solvable efficiently (e.g., MOSEK, SDPT3).
- Tools: SOSTOOLS, YALMIP.

SOS to SDP: How It Works

- Express $f(x) = Z(x)^T Q Z(x)$.
- $Z(x)$ is a monomial basis vector.
- $Q \succeq 0$ ensures positivity.
- SDP solvers can find Q .

Positivstellensatz

Let $S = \{\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid p_1(\vec{x}) \geq 0 \wedge \cdots \wedge p_m(\vec{x}) \geq 0\}$.

- We wish to show that $p \geq 0$ on S for given p .
- Important: We will need S to be compact.

Putinar's Positivstellensatz

Let $M = \{\sum_{j=1}^m \sigma_j p_j + \sigma_0 \mid \sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_m \text{ SOS}\}.$

- Archimedean Property: There exists a K such that

$$K - (x_1^2 + \dots + x_n^2) \in M$$

- Theorem (Putinar'1993):
- If $p \in M$ then $p_1 \geq 0 \wedge \dots \wedge p_m \geq 0 \models p \geq 0.$
- If S compact and M is Archimedean, then $p_1 \geq 0 \wedge \dots \wedge p_m \geq 0 \models p > 0$ then $p \in M.$

Positivstellensatz to Semi-Definite Programming

- Problem: prove the following entailment.

$$p_1 \geq 0 \wedge \cdots \wedge p_m \geq 0 \models p \geq 0$$

- Strategy: Find, $\sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_m$ such that

$$p = \sigma_0 + \sum_{j=1}^m \sigma_j p_j, \text{ and } \sigma_j \text{ SOS}$$

- Bound the degrees of $\sigma_0, \dots, \sigma_m \in \mathbb{R}_{2d}[\vec{x}]$

Reduction to SDP

- Fix a basis of monomials $\mu(\vec{x})$
- $\sigma_i = \mu^t X_i \mu$
- $p = \sigma_0 + \sum_{j=1}^m \sigma_j p_j$
- Equate monomials on LHS and RHS.
- $\sum_{j=0}^m (P_{i,j}, X_j) = c_i$
- Place X_1, \dots, X_n in a block diagonal form.

$$X = \begin{bmatrix} X_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & X_2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & X_n \end{bmatrix}$$

Certificates


Degree \ Field	Complex	Real
Linear	<i>Range/Kernel</i> Linear Algebra	<i>Farkas Lemma</i> Linear Programming
Polynomial	<i>Nullstellensatz</i> Bounded degree: LP Groebner bases	<i>Positivstellensatz</i> Bounded degree: SDP

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¹P. Parrilo and S. Lall, ECC 2003


Barrier Functions - [Prajna et al.]



- $B(\vec{x}) > 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_u$ (B is **positive** when **unsafe**)
- $B(\vec{x}) < 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_i$ (B is **negative** when **init**)
- $B(\vec{x}) = 0$ implies $\nabla B(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) \leq 0$

Control Barrier Functions - [Ames et al.]


Control invariant set:



- $B(\vec{x}) > 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_u$ (B is **positive** when **unsafe**)
- $B(\vec{x}) < 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_i$ (B is **negative** when **init**)
- $B(\vec{x}) = 0$ implies there **exists a control input** $\vec{u} \in U$ such that $\nabla B(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) < 0$

Control Barrier Functions - Exponential [Kong et al.]

- State: $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$
- Control inputs: $\vec{u} \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- $\dot{\vec{x}} = f(\vec{x}, \vec{u})$, $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$,



- $B(\vec{x}) > 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_u$ (B is **positive** when **unsafe**)
- $B(\vec{x}) < 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_i$ (B is **negative** when **init**)
- for all $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ there **exists a control input** $\vec{u} \in U$ s.t. $\nabla B(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) \leq -\lambda B(\vec{x})$

Control Barrier Functions - Exponential [Kong et al.]

- State: $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$
- Control inputs: $\vec{u} \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- $\dot{\vec{x}} = f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}), X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n,$

It's a hard problem:

- Trying to synthesize *Barrier* and *Control* simultaneously
- Bilinearity

- $B(\vec{x}) > 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_u$ (B is **positive** when **unsafe**)
- $B(\vec{x}) \leq 0$ for all $\vec{x} \in X_i$ (B is **negative** when **init**)
- for all $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ there **exists a control input** $\vec{u} \in U$ s.t. $\nabla B(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) \leq -\lambda B(\vec{x})$

Barrier Synthesis using SOS

$$\text{Find } B(\vec{x}) \text{ s.t. } \left. \begin{array}{l} \forall \vec{x} \in X_u, B(\vec{x}) > 0 \\ \forall \vec{x} \in X_o, B(\vec{x}) < 0 \\ \forall \vec{x}, \nabla B(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}) \leq -\lambda B(\vec{x}) \end{array} \right\}$$

Enforced using SOS
+
Putinar's Positivstellensatz
[Parillo et al.]

Certifying SOS Programs

Verify that numerical issues do not invalidate the SOS programming results.

- Each barrier has multiple entailment relations:

$$p_1(\vec{x}) \geq 0, \dots, p_m(\vec{x}) \geq 0 \models p \geq 0,$$

- Certify via a Putinar positivstellensatz proof that states that

$$\exists \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_m \in \text{SOS}_d[\vec{x}] \quad p - \sigma_1 p_1 - \dots - \sigma_m p_m \in \text{SOS}_d[\vec{x}],$$

($\text{SOS}_d[\vec{x}]$ represents the set of all SOS polynomials over \vec{x} of degree at most d)

Certifying SOS Programs

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} B_i(\vec{x}) > 0; \forall \vec{x} \in X_u \\ B_i(\vec{x}) \leq 0; \forall \vec{x} \in X_i \\ \nabla B_i(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) \leq \lambda B_i(\vec{x}) \end{array} \right.$$

$$B_i(\vec{x}) \equiv \sum \alpha_i p_i + \alpha_0$$

$$-B_i(\vec{x}) \equiv \sum \beta_i q_i + \beta_0$$

$$\nabla B_i(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) - \lambda B_i(\vec{x}) \equiv \sum \sigma_i r_i + \sigma_0$$

$$\alpha_i, \beta_i, \sigma_i, \dots \implies m(\vec{x})^\top Q_i m(\vec{x})$$

Q_i should be **positive semi-definite**

Certifying SOS Programs

How to certify:

- output the polynomials $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_m$
- compute the “residue” $p - \sigma_1 p_1 - \dots - \sigma_m p_m$
- obtain a representation $\sigma_i = m(\vec{x})^\top Q_i m(\vec{x})$
- verify that Q_i is positive semi-definite by computing its Cholesky decomposition

The C++ library *Eigen* was used to carry out the Cholesky decomposition using 512 bit floating point representation

Robust Sum of Squares

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} B_i(\vec{x}) > 0; \forall \vec{x} \in X_u \\ B_i(\vec{x}) \leq 0; \forall \vec{x} \in X_i \\ \nabla B_i(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) \leq \lambda B_i(\vec{x}) \end{array} \right.$$

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$$B_i(\vec{x}) \equiv \sum \alpha_i p_i + \alpha_0 + \alpha_{DSOS}$$

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$$\nabla B_i(\vec{x}) \cdot f(\vec{x}, \vec{u}) - \lambda B_i(\vec{x}) \equiv \sum \sigma_i r_i + \sigma_0 + \sigma_{DSOS}$$

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$$\alpha_i, \beta_i, \sigma_i, \dots \implies m(\vec{x})^\top Q_i m(\vec{x})$$

Q_i should be **positive semi-definite**

Can we automate these proofs in LEAN?

Example: Robot Avoiding Obstacle

- Dynamical system with circular unsafe region.
- Synthesize $B(\vec{x})$ to separate safe and unsafe sets.
- Use SOS programming to certify $\dot{B}(\vec{x}) \leq 0$.

Tools and Workflow

- Modeling: MATLAB, Python, **Julia**
- SOS Programming: SOSTOOLS, YALMIP, **SumOfSquares.jl**
- SDP Solvers: SeDuMi, SDPT3, MOSEK, **CSDP**

Example Workflow





- Define variables and constraints.
- Encode certificate (invariant, barrier, etc).
- Run SOS optimization.
- Export certificate and verify.

To jupyter notebook ...

Takeaways

- SOS provides efficient method for real-valued verification.
- Positivstellensatz connects constraints to proof.
- SOS + SDP scales better than symbolic QE.
- Useful in hybrid systems, control, optimization.

Further Reading



www.sumofsquares.org